ABSTRACT Intelligent Agents act in open and thus risky environments, hence making the appropriate decision about who to trust in order to interact with, could be a challenging process.
Introduction
Intelligent Agents (IAs) act in open and thus risky environments, hence making the appropriate decision about the degree of trust that can be invested in a certain partner is vital yet really challenging [41] . Over the last few years, scientific research in this field has significantly increased. Most researchers tend to consider trust and reputation as key elements in the design and implementation of modern multi-agent systems (MASs). However, there is still no single, accepted definition of trust within the research community, although it is generally defined as the expectation of competence and willingness to perform a given task. Broadly speaking, trust has been defined in a number of ways in the literature, depending on the domain of use. Among these definitions, there is one that can be used as a reference point for understanding trust, provided by Dasgupta [12] . According to Dasgupta, trust is a belief an agent has that the other party will do what it says it will (being honest and reliable) or reciprocate (being reciprocative for the common good of both), given an opportunity to defect to get higher payoffs.
Trust, however, is much more than that; the uncertainties found in the modern MASs present a number of new challenges. More specifically, MASs are open distributed systems, and defeaters. Strict rules are rules in the classical sense, whenever the premises are indisputable, e.g. facts, then so is the conclusion. Thus, they can be used for definitional clauses. Defeasible rules, on the other hand, are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to prevent some conclusions. The form of rules, in symbolic and d-POSL syntax [25] , are presented in Table 1 . Finally, the superiority relation is a binary relation defined over the set of rules, which determines the relative strength of two (conflicting) rules, i.e. rules that infer conflicting literals. Table 1 . Rules in Defeasible Logic. The main concept in DL is that it does not support contradictory conclusions, but it tries to resolve conflicts. Hence, in cases where there is some support for concluding A, but there is also support for concluding ¬A, no conclusion is derived unless one of the two rules that support these conflicting conclusions has priority over the other. This priority is expressed through a superiority relation among rules which defines priorities among them, namely where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. Yet, conclusions can be classified as definite or defeasible. A definite conclusion is a conclusion that cannot be withdrawn when new information is available. A defeasible conclusion, on the other hand, is a tentative conclusion that might be withdrawn in the future. In addition, the logic is able to tell whether a conclusion is or is not provable, hence there are four possible types of conclusions; positive definite, negative definite, positive defeasible and negative defeasible.
RULE TYPE RULE FORM D-POSL SYNTAX

STRICT RULES
Positive definite conclusions are provable using only facts and strict rules while negative definite conclusions are not provable by using these. Positive defeasible conclusions can be defeasible proved, while negative defeasible conclusions are not even defeasibly provable. Strict derivations are obtained by forward chaining of strict rules, while a defeasible conclusion A can be derived if there is a rule whose conclusion is A, whose premises have either already been proved or given in the form of facts and any stronger rule whose conclusion is ¬A (the negation of A) has premises that fail to be derived or the latter rule has been defeated by an even stronger rule. In this context, a special case of conflict is between different positive literals, all derived by different defeasible rules, whereas only one should be derived. "Conflicting literals" are defined through a conflict set and the conflict is resolved through superiorities. [7] 3 DISARM
The proposed model is called DISARM and it is a distributed, hybrid, rule-based reputation model. DISARM uses defeasible logic in order to combine in a practical way all available ratings, both those based on the agent's personal experience and those provided by known and/or unknown third parties. This model aims not only at reducing the disadvantages of the common distributed approaches, such as the difficulty in locating ratings, but mainly it aims at improving the performance of the hybrid approach by providing an intuitive decision making mechanism.
DISARM aims at providing a distributed mechanism based on defeasible logic that would be able to model the way humans think, infer and decide.
Main principles of the DISARM Model
For purposes of better understanding, we present here the main principles of our model. First of all, DISARM has no centralized authority since it is a distributed model. Hence, it is each agent's responsibility to locate ratings and use the model. In this context, even if more than one agents have available the same ratings, they probably will come out with different estimations and as a result they will take different decisions.
Time, evolution over time in particular, is an important issue since it reflects the behavior of an agent. More specifically, in dynamic environments such as MASs, agents may change their objectives at any time. For instance, a typical dishonest agent could provide quality services over a period to gain a high reputation score, and then, profiting from that high score could provide low quality services. Hence, time should be and it is taken into account in the proposed model.
Yet, DISARM allows agents to decide on their own about what they consider important. To this end, it is up to each agent's strategy to determine the value of time. Agents could take into account all the available ratings or only the latest; e.g. those referred to last week, last month or last year.
Taking into account the latest ratings leads undoubtedly to an up-to-date overview, however it could be misleading. For instance, in this limited time period, a typical dishonest agent could temporary improve its behavior or, on the other hand, a typical reliable agent, facing a problem, could temporary act faulty, transformed into a mercenary and malicious agent. Hence, it is a risk to take into account only part of the available ratings, although there is sometimes significant gain in time and computational cost. In contrary, taking into account all available ratings leads to an overview of an agent's behavior history but it costs in terms of storage space, execution time and computational power.
DISARM, however, is a distributed model which means that locating ratings is a quite challenging process. The rating records could be always there but usually they are unreachable since various agents may join or leave the system at any time. For instance, sometimes only a few ratings are available; e.g. personal experience could be missing and/or appropriate witnesses could be difficult to locate. On the other hand, sometimes there is a large amount of available ratings but taking all of them into account has significant computational cost. Moreover, these ratings may significantly differ. In this context, DISARM integrates an indication of how likely is the assessment to be proved correct based on the variability of ratings that were taken into account. In other words, DISARM allows agents to be informed about the possibility of wrong estimation and loss.
Another important issue that DISARM deals with is the trust relationships that agents build and maintain over time, much as individuals do in real world. For instance, if an agent is satisfied with a partner, probably it will prefer to interact again with that partner in the future. On the other hand, if it is disappointed by a partner, it will avoid interacting again with that partner.
To this end, DISARM proposes the use of two lists, called white-list and black-list. Each agent stores in its white-list the names of its favored partners while in its black-list it stores those that should be avoided. The decision about who will be added in each list is taken by the agent itself.
More specifically, each agent is equipped with a rule-based decision-making logic which enables it to decide upon its partners, adding them, if necessary, to the appropriate list. Hence, it will be easy for the agent to locate a well-known old partner that will do the job and at the same time avoid a fraud. Moreover, a user is much more likely to believe statements from a trusted acquaintance than from a previously known dishonest agent or a stranger.
Finally, additionally to the difficulty to locate ratings is the difficulty to locate really useful ratings. For instance, sometimes agents are involved in important and crucial for them interactions whereas sometimes they are involved in simple interactions of minor importance.
Hence, the question is which of them should be taken into account in order to get a representative estimation. To this end, DISARM adopts the use of two more parameters for each rating; namely importance and confidence. Importance indicates how critical the transaction was for the rating agent while confidence gives an estimation of the agent's certainty for that rating.
Rating parameters
Taking into account the proper parameters for an assessment is a really challenging task. They should be carefully chosen in order to reflect the agents' abilities. Besides, an efficient decision making mechanism has to rely on carefully selected data and a straightforward and efficient rating procedure. Although, a thorough overview of related literature is out of the scope of this article, we tried to catch out parameters, or factors for others, that are usually referred either explicitly or implicitly in reputation models and metrics, e.g. [8, 9, 16, 19, 22, 49, 48] . To this end, DISARM uses for its needs six properties; namely response time, validity, completeness, correctness, cooperation and outcome feeling.
Response time refers to the time that an agent needs in order to complete the tasks that it is responsible for. Time is the only parameter that is always taken into account in the literature. 
Rule-based decision mechanism
Defining the rating values is the first step towards an efficient reputation model, the core of the approach, however, is its decision making mechanism. The distributed reputation models have invariably to deal with a range of complex issues related to the decision making process, such as locating ratings. Hence, DISARM aims at providing a trust estimation procedure much as individuals do in real world, where they build and maintain trust relationships over time. To this end, DISARM simulates their decision making process, proposing a set of strict and defeasible rules, in a practical, intuitive approach.
Rating procedure
First of all, as soon as, an interaction ends each agent evaluates its partner in terms of response time, validity, completeness, correctness, cooperation and outcome feeling. Then it adds its confidence and a value indicating the importance of the transaction (transaction value). When all values are got together, the rating agent (truster) adds its name, the trustee's name and the current time point (t), forming the final rating value (r) as a tuple with eleven elements. This tuple is presented below in the compact d-POSL syntax [25] of defeasible RuleML [3] . A syntax that will be used throughout this article in order to express in a compact way the data (ratings) and rules (strict and defeasible rules used in the decision making process) of our approach. However, characterizing a trustee's behavior good or bad does not, necessary, mean that this trustee will be added to the truster's white or black list, respectively. This decision is left to the truster's private strategy and it could vary greatly from agent to agent. For instance, a truster could be lenient and, thus, it might add quite easily trustees to its white-list. Another truster might expect to see good behavior several times either for the same reason (r 8 , where ?self represents the truster itself) or for a number of reasons (r 9 ), before adding a trustee to its white-list.
Similarly, a truster might expect to face a trustee's bad behavior more than one times either for the same reason (r 10 ) or for a number of reasons (r 11 ), before adding the trustee to its black-list.
Hence, a strict truster would easily add trustees to its black-list but not to its white-list whereas a lenient would give more changes before adding a trustee to its own black-list. 
Locating ratings
A major challenge for open distributed and sometimes large-scaled (multi-agent) systems is how to locate ratings among the rest of the community. The simplest and most common approach in such a distributed environment is to send a request message [50, 23] . Yet, the question is how and to whom this message should be sent directly and probably propagated by the direct and indirect receivers. To this end, using as a guide research on peer-to-peer networks [1] , there are two core ways to propagate messages in order to locate peers (or ratings in our case) [33] . The first approach assigns a maximum time-to-live (TTL) parameter to each request message hence the requesting peer sends the message to its neighbors, who relay it to their own neighbors and so on until the time-to-live value is reached. The second approach allows peers to relay the message only to one neighbor at time, since they have to wait the response from a neighbor before forward the message to another neighbor. The first approach increases the communication cost, leading to significant higher bandwidth consumption but partners (and so ratings) are located fast. On the other hand, the second approach requires low bandwidth but it leads to time delays since more time is required to get feedback for the requests.
Over the last years, a number of researchers have proposed approaches that try to reduce bandwidth or improve response time (e.g. [30, 40] ), mainly focusing on how to reach good and far away peers. Although, it is out of the scope of this article to research or improve peer-to-peer message propagate protocols, we were inspired by these approaches. or bad (black-list). Hence, the known agents of an agent are, in our point of view, its neighbors.
Using the knowledge represented by the social graph, DISARM is able to determine the proximity relationships among agents in the environment. In this context, it is easier for an agent to propagate its requests and eventually locate appropriate ratings.
Hence, an agent A that wants to collect ratings referred to agent X, does not send a request message to all agents but only to those stored in its white-list. The motivation behind this action is the fact that a user is much more likely to believe statements from a trusted acquaintance than from a previously known dishonest agent or a stranger. Yet, these previously known and well behaved agents may have no interaction history with agent X. This could lead to limited or zero feedback for the requesting agent A. To this end, adopting the notion of TTL, in DISARM each ratings request message is accompanied with a TTL value, where TTL represents the hops in the graph. Hence, each request is characterized by its horizon (TTL value) that determines how far the message will be propagated in the environment. In other words, the requesting agent determines if it is allowed (TTL ≠ 0) for its known (white-listed agents) to ask their own known agents, namely agents included in their white lists (WL ≡ {X k , … X l }) and so on. Hence, the request message will be propagated in steps; each time an agent receives such a request forwards it to its well-behaved known agents, if it is allowed (TTL ≠ 0), reducing the TTL value by one.
However, if the requesting agent is included in the black-list then its request message is ignored.
Moreover, the TTL value acts as a termination condition so that messages are not propagated indefinitely in the MAS; whenever an agent receives a request message with zero TTL does not forward the message. Finally, each agent will return, following the reverse path of the request, both its ratings and those provided by its partners, which eventually will be received by the initial requesting agent A. The above rule-based framework is, actually, logic independent since it can be implement in any logic. Yet, in DISARM, we use defeasible logic, as already mentioned, for purposes of simplicity and efficiency. 
Discarding ratings
As soon as, all available ratings are collected, an important decision has to be made; which ratings will be taken into account. Ratings represent the experience of the involved parties, which is distinguished to direct (agent's direct experience PR X ) and indirect experience. Indirect experience is divided in two categories, ratings provided by strangers (SR X ) and reports provided by known agents due to previous interactions. In this context, r 25 determines which agents are considered as known. Additionally to that, known agents are divided to three more categories; agents included in the WL white-list (WR X ), agents included in the BL black-list (BR X ) and the rest known agents (KR X ). It is well known that using different opinions of a large group maximizes the possibility of crossing out unfair ratings. Hence, using both direct and indirect experience could lead to more truthful estimations. However, sometimes one or more rating categories are missing, for instance, a newcomer has no personal experience and, thus, there are no available ratings (PR X ). To this end, we wish to ground our conclusions in trust relationships that have been built and maintained over time, much as individuals do in real world. For instance, a user is much more likely to believe statements from a trusted acquaintance than from a stranger. Thus, personal opinion (PR) is more valuable than acquaintances opinion (KR), which in turn is more valuable than strangers' opinion (SR).Furthermore, previously known and black-listed agents are generally considered unreliable than trusted agents (known agents or agents in the white-list) and, thus, they are ignored. Finally, agents in the white-list (WR) are usually more trusted than mere acquaintances (KR). In this context, the relationship among the rating categories is presented graphically in Fig. 1 . In order to understand Fig. 1 , the first level (top) suggests that all ratings count equally, whereas the fourth line (bottom), suggests an absolute preference to personal experience (PR), over whitelisted acquaintances (WR), over mere acquaintances (KR), and finally over strangers (SR). Thus, nodes on the left have precedence over nodes on the right. Furthermore, combinations of nodes from different levels can be made, provided that each rating source (PR, WR, KR, SR) is included only once. For example, one can combine node {PR, WR} from the third level with nodes {KR}, {SR} from the bottom level. This means that personal experience and experience of absolutely trusted acquaintances is treated equally, and both of them are preferred over ratings from mere acquaintances and over ratings from strangers.
As soon as the requesting agent A collects all the available ratings, it has to decide upon which of them will participate in the estimation. In order to do this, it has first to indicate which of them are eligible for participating in the final reputation value of agent X; namely a combination of four coefficients: R X = {PR X , WR X , KR X , SR X }. Hence, DISARM, as already since their ratings are more likely to be right. Additionally, confident trusters, that were interacting in an important for them transaction, are even more likely to report truthful ratings.
This assumption led to the following defeasible rules that define which ratings will be eligible for the reputation estimation and which not, according to the confidence and the transaction values, yet confidence and importance values are not involved in the estimation itself. Moreover, even if it is defined which ratings are eligible, the final choice is up to the requesting agent A's personal strategy. The criterion for this final choice, as already mentioned, is time. Other agents will prefer to take into account all eligible ratings whereas others will move one step further indicating which of the eligible ratings, e.g. the newest, will finally participate in the estimation. For instance, rules r 29 , r 29' and r 29'' are examples of such a decision; r 29 indicates that given a time period (from date-time to date-time) then only rating in this interval will count, r 29' indicates that only the latest (from a specific time point onwards) will count whereas r 29'' indicates that only ratings reported back to a time window will count (where now() returns the current time point). conclusions cannot be disputed.
The final decision making process for the R X is based on a relationship theory among the rating categories. In Fig. 1 , we presented the complete relationship among all rating categories, whereas, below, we present three potential theories based on that relationship. In the first theory, all categories count, hence, if ratings from all of them are available (r 34 to r 37 ), then they will all participate in the final reputation estimation. To this end, if one of them is missing, then the other two are combined, whereas if just one category is available, then just that will be taken into account. This theory is equivalent to the first row in Fig. 1 In the rest two theories, opinions from different categories conflict each other (conflicting literals), therefore the conflict is being resolved via adding superiority relationships. Specifically, personal opinion is the most important, and then comes white-listed agents' opinion, then simply known agents' and then strangers'. We will present only the superiority relationships and we will not duplicate the rules. The conflict set (for both theories) is:
In the second theory, the priority relationship among the rules is based on the fact that an agent relies on its own experience if it believes it is sufficient, if not it acquires the opinions of others, much as do humans in real life. This theory is equivalent to the last row in Fig. 1 In the third theory, on the other hand, if direct experience is available (PR), then it is preferred to be combined with ratings from well trusted agents (WR). On the other hand, if personal experience is not available, then ratings from well trusted agents is preferred over just known agents, which is preferred over ratings coming from strangers. In the end, if nothing of the above is available, DISARM acts as a pure witness system. This theory is equivalent to the combination of the first node of the third row in Fig. 1 
Estimating Reputation
Agent A eventually reaches on a decision upon which rating is going to participate in the estimation (R X = {PR X , WR X , KR X , SR X }), according to the chosen relationship theory, as discussed above. In this context, in order to cross out outliers, extremely positive or extremely negative values, the rating values are logarithmically transformed. Outliers are rating values that differ significantly from the mean (a central tendency) and, thus, they can have a large impact on the estimation process that could mislead agents. To this end, the most important feature of the logarithm is that, relatively, it moves big values closer together while it moves small values farther apart and, thus, rating data are better analyzed. More specifically, many statistical techniques work better with data that are single-peaked and symmetric while it is easier to describe the relationship between variables when it is approximately linear. Thus, when these conditions are not true in the original data, they can often be achieved by applying a logarithmic transformation.
To this end, each rating is normalized (r∈ [-1,1] | -1≡terrible, 1≡perfect), by using 10 as the logarithm base. Thus, the final reputation value ranges from -1 to +1, where -1, +1, 0 stand for absolutely negative, absolutely positive and neutral, respectively, which means that an agent's reputation could be either negative or positive. Hence, the final reputation value R X is a function ℑ that combines the transformed ratings for each available category:
Moreover, since DISARM aims at simulating human behavior, it allows agents to determine what and how important is each rating parameter for them. In other words, an agent may consider validity more important than all, while it may not care at all about the outcome feeling of the interaction. An example could be the following: {response time→20%, validity→50%, completeness→10%, correctness→10%, cooperation→10%, outcome feeling→0%}. Hence, agents are allowed to provide specific weights (w i , i∈ [1, 6] ) that will indicate their personal preferences according the ratings' coefficients. Formula 2, which is the modified Formula 1, calculates the weighted normalized values:
log log log log , , 
Moving one step further, we try to understand deeper the relationship among the rating categories that participate in the estimation. It is up to the chosen relationship theory, presented in the previous subsection, which categories will participate, yet there is no clue about their percentage use in the estimation. To this end, in DISARM the user, through his/her agent A, is able to set what we call the "social trust weights" (π p , π w , π k , π s ). These weights specify the balance between personal experience (π p ) and witness reputation (π w , π k , π s ). Hence, the final reputation value R X is calculated according to which experience is more important for the end user (Formula 3).
( )
(i.e. the most recent), the more it weighs. Hence, Formula 4 represents DISARM's final metric.
Moreover, mention that a potential example of this formula, the simplest one for function ℑ , could be the summation; in the sense that all categories participate additively in the final value, each one with its own weight.
( ) 
Measuring estimation confidence
As already mentioned, DISARM also studies the variability of the ratings that were finally taken into account as a measure about the confidence of the estimation itself. For this purpose, we use standard deviation. It measures the amount of variation or dispersion from the average. Yet, in addition to expressing the variability of a population, the standard deviation is commonly used to measure confidence in statistical conclusions. In other words, the standard deviation is a measure of how spread out numbers are. A low standard deviation indicates that the data points (here ratings) tend to be very close to the mean, the expected value, hence it is more likely the estimation to be closer to the agent's actual behavior. On the other hand, a high standard deviation indicates that the data points (ratings) are spread out over a large range of values and, thus, it is difficult to predict the agent's behavior. Formula 5 presents the standard deviation metric used in DISARM, where N represents the total amount of used (in formula 4) ratings (r). More specifically, in DISARM the above formula does not participate in the estimation process itself nor affect, in any way, the reputation value. Its role is to act complement to DISARM's final metric (formula 4), in order to indicate the probability the estimated value (formula 4) to be close to reality. The motivation behind the use of the standard deviation formula (formula 5) was the fact that although reputation models provide an estimated reputation value they do not provide any clue about how likely is this estimation to reflect the agent's true behavior. To this end, DISARM provides an additional tool (formula 5) in order to assist agents, and thus their users, to make the best for them choices.
responsible for recording and representing information related to registered in the environment agents, namely their name, type, registration time and activity. This information is dynamically stored in the AYPS agent's database. Hence, the service is able to retrieve up-to-date information at any time.
Hence, even if DISARM, or any other distributed model, is a distributed reputation model, agents that use it are able to send requests to AYPS in order to get first a list of potential partners. Next, they will use the DISARM model in order to estimate reputation for one or more of them in order to find the most appropriate partner. Of course, it is not necessary to use such services; it is up to each agent's personal strategy how it will locate potential partners. The more an agent knows the environment, the better it can choose providers and, thus, the more utility gains. In this context, agents in the environment are free to ask others for their opinion (ratings), hence each agent requests the service from the most trustworthy and reliable provider according to it. Furthermore, concerning DISARM's final metric (formula 4), in this section we adopt the addition as shown below: 
To this end, taking all the above into account, the testbed in each experiment is populated with provider and consumer agents. Each consumer agent is equipped with a particular trust model (a centralized approach is also included), which helps it select a provider when it needs to use a service. The only difference among consumer agents is the trust models that they use, so the utility gained by each agent through simulations will reflect the performance of its trust model in selecting reliable providers for interactions. As a result, the testbed records the UG of each interaction with each trust model used. Consumer agents without the ability to choose a trust model will randomly select a provider from the list. Furthermore, in order to obtain an accurate result for performance comparisons between trust models, each one will be employed by a large but equal number of consumer agents. [27] and NONE (no trust mechanism, randomly selected providers). We used HARM although it is a centralized approach since it is a rule-based model using temporal defeasible reasoning. In this context, taking into account all the available data, Fig 2 depicts the overall ranking regarding the utility gained for all models, even for absence of model, namely NONE (random selection). As shown in Fig. 2 NONE performance is poor and, as expected, consistently the lowest.
HARM, on the other hand, is consistently the highest. This is not surprising since HARM is a rule-based, centralized model. Hence, it is able to gather ratings about all interactions in the system as opposed to the rest distributed models, where locating rating is a challenging task by itself. This allows agents using HARM to achieve higher performance right from the first interactions. Concerning, the distributed models, it is clear that DISARM, Certified Reputation and Social Regret gain a quite high UG value, yet they unable to reach the performance of centralized models like HARM. Among distributed models, DISARM achieves a slight high performance, mainly due to the fact that it is using a dynamic (defeasible) reputation estimation mechanism that enables agents to take more intuitive decisions and, thus, increase their performance. Furthermore, DISARM enables agents to get familiarized with the environment faster as opposed to CRM and FIRE which, as shown in Fig. 2 , need more time to know the environment and stabilize their performance. Although, centralized models achieve higher UG score they have significant limitations in terms of execution time and storage space. This is not surprising since centralized models are, usually, managed by a single agent. This manager has to store all ratings in the system, which are increased over time, and to respond to an increasing number of requests, leading to bottle-neck effect. On the other hand, distributed models store just their own ratings and those obtained by witnesses which are far less than the whole available ratings in the system. Additionally, these extra witness ratings could be erased after use, releasing space. As shown in Fig. 3 , HARM, being a centralized model, needs much more space than distributed models, reaching even the double. On the other hand, models like DISARM and Social Regret that take into account social aspects, need less space, even from other distributed approaches, since they collect less ratings.
Hence, the more ratings used by a model the more space (and usually time) is needed.
Trust and reputation represent a significant aspect in modern multi-agent systems. An interesting and very challenging active research area is already focused on them; various models and metrics have already been proposed in order to deal with the challenging decision making processes in the agent community [17, 15, 37] . Reputation is used to build trust among agents, minimizing the risk involved in the transactions and increasing users' confidence and satisfaction. Hence, since the best decisions are those that taken under the minimum risk, trust and reputation models support agents to take promising decisions regarding potential partners.
To this end, one of the first, if not the first, model that used the idea of witness reputation was a decentralized trust model, called Regret [47, 45] . Regret is, actually, one of the most representative trust and reputation models in multi-agent systems. It combines witness reports and direct interaction experience in order to provide reputation values. Additionally, in Regret ratings are dealt with respect to time; old ratings are given less importance compared to new
ones. An evolution of Regret, a primary attempt to locate witnesses' ratings, called Social Regret [46] , was also presented by the authors. Social Regret is a reputation system oriented to ecommerce environments that incorporates the notion of social graph. More specifically, Social
Regret groups agents with frequent interactions among them and considers each one of these groups as a single source of reputation values. In this context, only the most representative agent within each group is asked for information. To this end, a heuristic is used in order to find groups and to select the best agent to ask.
Social Regret, similarly to DISARM, is one of the rare cases that the social dimension of agents is taken into account. Yet, Social Regret does not reflect the actual social relations among agents, like DISARM, but rather attempts to heuristically reduce the number of queries to be done in order to locate ratings. Taking into account the opinion of only one agent of each group is a severe disadvantage since the most agents are marginalized, distorting reality. However, both
Regret and DISARM recognize the importance of time and take into account both personal and witness ratings. Yet, only DISARM allows agents to decide on their own about what they consider important regarding time. Additionally, only DISARM provides a knowledge-based mechanism, promoting a nonmonotonic, more flexible, human-like approach.
Another popular distributed model is FIRE [21] . FIRE integrates four types of trust and reputation, namely interaction trust, role-based trust, witness reputation and certified reputation.
Interaction trust and witness reputation are, as in DISARM, an agent's past experience from direct interactions and reports provided by witnesses about an agent's behavior, respectively.
Role-based trust, on the other hand, is trust defined by various role-based relationships between the agents whereas certified reputation is third-party references provided by the target agents. The aforementioned values are combined into a single measure by using the weighted mean method.
FIRE similar to DISARM recognizes the need for hybrid models that will take into account more than one source for the final reputation estimation. Yet, although FIRE take into account more sources than DISARM, it uses a weak computation model for the final combination and reputation estimation. DISARM, on the other hand, provides a human-like knowledge-based mechanism, based on defeasible logic that let agents take into account the most promising available rating in order to predict the future behavior of a potential partner. Additionally, only DISARM takes in account the social dimension of multi-agent systems with respect to time.
Another remarkable reputation model is Certified Reputation [20] , a decentralized reputation model, like DISARM, involving each agent keeping a set of references given to it from other agents. In this model, each agent is asked to give certified ratings of its performance after every transaction. The agent then chooses the highest ratings and stores them as references. Any other agent can then ask for the stored references and calculate the agent's certified reputation.
This model overcomes the problem of initial reliability in a similar way with DISARM.
However, opposed to our approach, this model is designed to determine the access rights of agents, rather than to determine their expected performance. Furthermore, it is a witness-based model, whereas DISARM combines both witnesses and direct experience, providing a rule-based methodology to deal with the discrimination issue. Furthermore, although in Certified Reputation agents are freed from the various costs involved in locating witness reports, such as resource, time and communication costs, ratings might be misquoted since it is each agent's responsibility to provide ratings about itself and in the fact the best ones.
TRR (Trust-Reliability-Reputation) trust model [44] allows a software agent to represent both the reliability and the reputation of another agent, merging finally these measures into a global trust evaluation. It uses a dynamically computed weight that represents how an agent considers important the reliability with respect to the reputation when it computes the trust of another agent. Yet, the weight depends on the number of interactions between the two agents, which is actually a problem when these agents have no interaction history. Hence, TRR provides a mechanism for estimating the global reputation value of an agent based on previous interactions. On the other hand, DISARM provides a knowledge-based mechanism that enables each agent to estimate a personalized reputation based on its preferences. Moreover, DISARM takes into account plenty of issues, such as time and social relations, although it does not deal with reliability issues as TRR does. Additionally, DISARM is a nonmonotonic approach based on defeasible logic that provides a more flexible, human-like approach that enables agents not only to estimate a reputation value but also to decide upon their relationships in the community.
CRM (Comprehensive Reputation Model) [24] is another typical distributed reputation model. In CRM the ratings used to assess the trustworthiness of a particular agent can either be obtained from an agent's interaction history or collected from other agents that can provide their suggestions in the form of ratings; namely interaction trust and witness reputation, respectively.
CRM is a probabilistic-based model, taking into account the number of interactions between agents, the timely relevance of provided information and the confidence of reporting agents on the provided data. More specifically, CRM, first, takes into account direct interactions among agents, calling the procedure online trust estimation. After a variable interval of time, the actual performance of the evaluated agent is compared against the information provided by other agents in a procedure called off-line. Off-line procedure considers the communicated information to judge the accuracy of the consulting agents in the previous on-line trust assessment process. In other words, in CRM the trust assessment procedure is composed of on-line and off-line evaluation processes. Both CRM and DISARM acknowledge the need for hybrid reputation models taking into account time issues, yet they propose a starkly opposite approach.
Additionally, both models use a confidence parameter in order to weight ratings more accurately.
However, DISARM takes into account a variety of additional parameters, allowing users to define weights about them. As a result, more accurate and personalized estimations are provided.
Furthermore, only DISARM considers the social relations among agents providing a nonmonotonic approach that let them establish and maintain trust relationships, locating quite easily reliable ratings.
Finally, HARM [27] , a previous work of us, is a hybrid rule-based reputation model that uses temporal defeasible logic in order to combine interaction trust and witness reputation. Yet, it is a centralized approach which actually overcomes the difficulty to locate witness reports. DISARM, on the other, hand is also a hybrid but distributed model that uses defeasible (yet not temporal) logic in a similar point of view. Actually, DISARM is an updated and extended model based partially on HARM's principles though adapting a decentralized approach. To this end, although both models consider time important, they are dealing with it with a totally different approach.
Ratings in HARM are characterized by a time offset property, which indicates the time instances that should pass in order to consider each rating active while each of them counts only for a limited time duration. DISARM uses the time itself in the final estimation formula, letting agents to use a similar to human thinking philosophy that first decides upon which category of rating should be taken into account and then discards ratings included there. Comparing, these two models, we believe that DISARM and HARM, despite their similarities and differences, are two nonmonotonic models that enable agents to improve their effectiveness and intuitiveness in a way more related to the traditional human reasoning for assessing trust in the physical word.
Conclusions and Future Work
This article presented DISARM, a social, distributed, hybrid, rule-based reputation model which uses defeasible logic. DISARM though appropriate rules, combines interaction trust and witness reputation. Moreover, it limits the common disadvantages of the existing distributed trust approaches, such as locating ratings, by considering the agents acting in the environment as a social network. Hence, each agent is able to propagate its requests in the rest community, locating quite fast ratings from previously known and well-rated agents. Additionally, DISARM's mechanism is based on defeasible logic, modeling the way intelligent agents, like humans, draw reasonable conclusions from inconclusive information, which is one of the main advantages of the model. Actually, it is one of the first models that use nonmonotonic knowledge, in the form of defeasible logic in order to predict agents' future behavior. It is based on well-established estimation parameters [8, 9] , such as information correctness, completeness, and validity, agent's response time and cooperation, as well as outcome feeling of the interaction. Hence, DISARM can be adopted in any multi-agent system in the Semantic Web, such as JADE and EMERALD.
Finally, we provided an evaluation that illustrates the usability of the proposed model.
As for future directions, first of all, we plan to study further DISARM's performance by comparing it to more reputation models from the literature and use it in real-world applications, combining it also with Semantic Web metadata for trust [10, 11] . Another direction is towards improving DISARM. There are still some open issues and challenges regarding, for instance, rating locating. More technologies could be adopted for these purpose; ontologies, machine learning techniques and user identity recognition and management are some of them.
